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 ECOCRITICISM, CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISM, 
AND ECOLOGIES OF MIND 
Notes on Calvino’s Cosmicomics 
Serenella IOVINO 
 “Ecology,” like Aristotle’s being, can be conceived in many ways. 
Ernst Heinrich Haeckel, the German biologist who coined the term in 
1866, defined it as “the economy of nature,” the “comprehensive science 
of the relationships of the organism to the environment, which in the 
widest sense includes all conditions of existence” (Haeckel 1866: I, 236, 
my translation). Yet over time ideas, just like organisms, evolve, 
multiplying and differentiating. Today not only do we speak of “ecologies” 
in the plural form, but ecology, as the “comprehensive science of the 
relationships,” has become a paradigm, a model of thought based on the 
articulated interconnections of elements with each other and with the 
environment in which they are situated. Such elements can be living 
beings, but also ideas, cultures, imaginative forms. Correspondingly, the 
term “environment” can be used to denote both the natural and the social 
context of such interrelated phenomena.  
In the early 1970s, the British epistemologist Gregory Bateson 
introduced the concept of “ecology of mind” as the process of mutual 
actions occurring between ideas and, more in general, between nature 
and culture, ideas and environment. This vision is underpinned by “the 
notion that ideas are interdependent, interacting, that ideas live and die. 
[...] It is a sort of complex and living tangle that fights and collaborates, 
like the one that can be found in woods on the mountains, made of trees, 
plants and animals living there, indeed, in an ecology” (Bateson 1997: 
399-400). Bateson’s ecology of mind sheds new light on the way ideas 
develop and spread. Due to the symmetry existing between the levels of 
reality, the structure of our interpersonal relationships or that of our 
learning processes mirror the organization of the biosphere: all these 
levels can be thus considered as parts of a recursive communicative 
Serenella IOVINO 
 PERCORSI 114 
order, a feedback process that turns elementary information into 
complex structures. From the point of view of both biology and culture, 
the basic ecological principle is thus information, and not bare energy. In 
this perspective, the self and the natural order constitute an information 
system. Their unity explains how ideas and environment form an 
interdependent web of ecological principles. Here the dualism between 
mind and body, spirit and matter, self and nature is explicitly rejected. 
And, since such a dualism is basically the premise of every form of 
humanism, one can conclude that there is nothing “humanistic” or 
spiritual in the life of the mind. This expression—”life of the mind”—has, 
in turn, to be meant literally.1 
These introductory remarks are useful to understand the grounding 
theoretical assumption of ecocriticism, namely, the idea that environment 
and culture actively permeate each other. As interpretative method, 
ecocriticism implies a literary ecology that is, in turn, a form of ecology of 
mind. In the framework of literary ecology, text and world build a 
complex information unit. Unified in a feedback loop, literary text and 
world are ecologically interdependent, in the sense that they establish a 
relation of action and re-action: just like the world acts on literature, 
conditioning its creative categories, literature may act on the world, 
conditioning our lifestyles and our relationships to nonhuman nature and 
beings. Between literature and the world there is a relation characterized 
by reciprocal interference and by a potentially mutual influence, and 
literary works might play an active role in exhibiting the values related to 
this mutuality. This implies the idea of a literature functional to a specific 
educational purpose: if literary works are read and interpreted in an 
“ecologically conscious” fashion, they become a potential instrument for 
ethical and environmental education, thus orienting human interactions 
with the more-than-human environment in more responsible directions 
(see Iovino 2010b). 
Yet how did this idea come about? The expression “literary ecology” 
appeared for the first time in 1972 as the subtitle of a book called The 
Comedy of Survival. Its author was Joseph Meeker, an American ecologist 
and literary scholar, a friend of Konrad Lorenz and of Norwegian eco-
philosopher Arne Naess. In The Comedy of Survival Meeker addresses an 
unprecedented question: 
 
Human beings are the earth’s only literary creatures. If the creation of literature 
is an important characteristic of the human species, it should be examined 
carefully and honestly to discover its influence upon human behavior and the 
natural environment – to determine what role, if any, it plays in the welfare and 
                                                                   
1 See also Bateson (1972) and Bateson (1979). On Bateson’s epistemology, see e.g. 
Harries-Jones (1995). 
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survival of mankind and what insight it offers into human relationships with 
other species and with the world around us. Is it an activity which adapts us 
better to the world or one which estranges us from it? From the unforgiving 
perspective of evolution and natural selection, does literature contribute more to 
our survival than it does to our extinction? (Meeker 1972: 3-4). 
 
Drawing on Darwin’s theory, Meeker considers literature as one of 
the outcomes of human evolution. In evolutionary terms, literature, like 
language, results from an instinct that human beings share with other 
living beings, and which is comparable for example to the instinct birds 
have to communicate by way of singing. The answer Meeker provides to 
his question is that literature, generally considered, does not contribute 
either to our survival or to our extinction. There are, however, literary 
genres, which are more evolutionarily “strategic” than others. In this 
respect, he maintains, comedy is more useful than tragedy to our survival. 
Whereas the latter is based on conflict, comedy’s structure implies 
horizontality, adaptability, and co-evolution. Meeker supplements this 
model with a “play ethic” in which the principles of evolutionism are 
combined with those of ethology (Konrad Lorenz authored the preface to 
the first edition of Meeker’s book), and implicitly with Friedrich Schiller’s 
aesthetic vision, according to which human beings fully accomplish their 
“humanity” through their impulse to play (Spieltrieb): the act of playing, 
in fact, reconciles the apparently antithetical human tendencies to form 
and matter, law and freedom.2  
Based on intra- and inter-species cooperation, Meeker’s play ethic is 
at once horizontal and inclusive. It implies a distinction between “finite” 
and “infinite” games. Finite games are based on rules and competition, 
and are finalized to obtain a reward. The infinite game’s only finality is, 
instead, “infinite playing”: its rules are not fixed and competition is 
almost absent.  
We can chart the “ecological” differences between comedy and 
tragedy as follows:  
 
COMEDY TRAGEDY 
 
Ecological behavior:  
Cooperation 
 
Anti-ecological behavior:  
Competition  
 
Intra- and inter-species unity: 
Circularity  
 
Separateness between life-forms:  
Linearity 
  
                                                                   
2 See Friedrich Schiller, Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795). 
Meeker’s ideas have ushered in the discipline of evolutionary narratology (see e.g. 
Carroll 2004; Boyd 2009).  
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The characters adapt to the outer 
world and evolve with and within it 
The characters clash with the 
outer world, culminating in a final 
catastrophe  
 
Open and inclusive system of values  
 
Unchangeable and self-referential 
system of values  
 
Picaro  
 
Tragic hero 
 
Picaresque novel: adventure, 
reconnection of humanity and 
environment 
 
Arcadia: pathos, fracture between 
humanity and environment  
 
Horizontal and democratic vision  
 
Elitist and hierarchical vision 
 
This interpretation of literary genres emphasizes two key-points: 1. 
the necessity of developing creative but not exclusively competitive 
relationships between human beings and nonhuman nature; and 2. the 
possibility of using fictional works to express the ethical implications of 
such relationships in a narrative form, supplementing literature with an 
ethical-educational dimension. In the broader discourse of environmental 
culture, Meeker’s theory aims to show that educational models based 
upon cooperation, (social as well as ecological) interdependency, and 
horizontality are to be preferred over models based on dualism and 
competition. This is an invitation to go past the anthropocentric and 
instrumentalist vision according to which only humans are endowed with 
an intrinsic ethical value, whereas nonhuman nature and life are 
considered as mere instruments. It is an invitation to privilege models 
based on complexity over models based on a human-centered hierarchy. 
 
Celebration of complexity and reversal of ontological hierarchies are 
Leitmotiven in Calvino’s work. His amazingly multifarious corpus includes 
a complete range of ecocritical motifs, whether naturalistic, theoretical, 
or eco-social. His whole narrative universe is dominated by the idea of 
nature. From the representation of an “alienated” nature within the urban 
landscape in his early novels and tales, such as A Plunge into Real Estate, 
Smog, and Marcovaldo, to the postmodern tales of Mr. Palomar and The 
Cosmicomics, nature is an extremely evanescent, problematic, ironic, and 
slippery subject. In Marcovaldo, for example, nature appears as 
“mischievous, counterfeit, compromised with artificial life” 
(Presentazione 1966 all’edizione scolastica di “Marcovaldo”; Calvino 2003: 
I, 1233. My translation). At the same time, nature is “always there,” 
lurking around the corner, silently hidden in unexpected places and 
unfamiliar or funny forms: a white gorilla in a zoo, bacteria in a piece of 
cheese, a couple of mating turtles, the enigmatic figures printed in a deck 
of ancient tarot cards, incumbent rubbish in an invisible city that 
Ecocriticism, Cultural Evolutionism, and Ecologies of Mind 
PERCORSI  117 
ceaselessly “renews itself,” or the cheerful, primeval chaos of a new-born 
universe, as in The Cosmicomics. In Calvino’s novels and tales, this 
ambivalence becomes a mirror game that, showing humans an estranged 
nature, finally reveals the self-estrangement of humans, who are 
themselves “artificial” beings.  
This is coupled to a fictional strategy that, especially in Calvino’s late 
works, becomes more and more anti-metaphysical and anti-subjectivist. 
Nature in fact is visible and eloquent only if the human ego recedes from 
its usual categories and languages. This both reverts and enlarges our 
cognitive patterns: “It is only after you have come to know the surface of 
things (…) that you can venture to seek what is underneath. But the 
surface of things is inexhaustible,” Mr. Palomar concludes (Calvino 1985: 
55). Only in a perceptive and conceptual horizon made of silent 
communication and patient observation do humans acquire familiarity 
with the world in which they happen to be: a world both before and after 
the human one, and inhabited by beings showing that “the world of man 
is neither eternal nor unique” (Calvino 1985: 86). Being at once 
anthropomorphic and anti-anthropocentric, Calvino’s narrative technique 
displaces the focus from human speech to the world’s countless voices, 
demonstrating that only if the ego is silent does the world become 
narratable.  
This idea influences the way Calvino represents the human subject, 
and it deeply conditions the place humans have in his “creative 
cosmology.” The human, for Calvino, always contains the sense and the 
matter of its own otherness. Shedding light on the multiple embodiments 
of such otherness, Calvino criticizes self-referential and unilateral images, 
thus disclosing new points of view on the human itself.3  
The Cosmicomics is an important chapter in this anti-anthropocentric 
and “Darwinian” poetics. Published in 1965, this collection of short 
stories is a very intriguing case study for ecocriticism. It can be 
considered as a form of “ecological” story-telling not only because it is an 
expansive narrative game endowed with all the features enunciated by 
Meeker, but also because the comic genre is “ecologically structured.” In 
other words, comedy is here an inclusive meta-genre, in which two other 
genres – young adult literature and science fiction – co-emerge and 
interact with each other. In this interaction, while science is depicted in 
playful, ironic and fable-like tones, the evolutionary perspective of the 
stories lends scientific support for criticizing anthropocentrism. 
The Cosmicomics is a “muddled” story of the universe. Scientific 
hypotheses give Calvino the cue for imagining adventures whose main 
                                                                   
3 For an interpretation of Calvino’s work in the broader framework of ecocriticism and 
posthumanist philosophy, see Iovino (forthcoming). 
Serenella IOVINO 
 PERCORSI 118 
character is always the same: the multiform (and unpronounceable) 
Qfwfq. Qfwfq is everything: he is a nebula, a simple cluster of primordial 
matter, a dinosaur on the verge of becoming extinct, a brand new 
mammal, just emerged from its previous evolutionary stage of pulmunate 
fish. Qfwfq is everything and nothing, because he is uncatchable and 
indefinable. He is, we could say, the universe itself in its endless 
synchronic and diachronic metamorphoses, the whole presenting itself in 
all its different fragments. 
For an idea of how science and fable are deeply and ironically 
intertwined, we can read some of the stories’ beginnings.  
Here, for example, inspiration is drawn explicitly from Darwinian 
theory: 
 
THE DINOSAURS 
The causes of the rapid extinction of the Dinosaur remain mysterious; the species 
had evolved and grown throughout the Triassic and the Jurassic and for 150 million 
years the Dinosaur had been the undisputed master of the continents. Perhaps the 
species was unable to adapt to the great changes of climate and vegetation which 
took place in the Cretaceous period. By its end all the Dinosaurs were dead.  
 
All except me, – Qfwfq corrected – because, for a certain period, I was also a 
Dinosaur: about fifty million years, I’d say, and I don’t regret it; if you were a 
Dinosaur in those days, you were sure you were in the right, and you made 
everyone look up to you (Calvino 1968: 95). 
 
THE AQUATIC UNCLE 
The first vertebrates who, in the Carboniferus period, abandoned the aquatic life for 
terrestrial, descended from the osseous, pulmunate fish whose fins were capable of 
rotation beneath their bodies and thus could be used as paws on the earth.  
 
By then it was clear that the water period was coming to an end – old Qfwfq 
recalled, – those who decided to make the great move were growing more and 
more numerous […]. But just at that time the differences among us were 
becoming accentuated: there might be a family that had been living on land, say, 
for several generations, whose young people acted in a way that wasn’t even 
amphibious but almost reptilian already; and there were others who lingered, 
still living like fish, those who, in fact, became even more fishy than they had been 
before (Calvino 1968: 69). 
 
Here, the author plots cosmologic hypotheses and physical theories: 
 
AT DAYBREAK 
The planets of the solar system […] began to solidify in the darkness, through the 
condensation of a fluid, shapeless nebula. All was cold and dark. Later the Sun 
began to become more concentrated until it was reduced almost to its present 
dimensions, and in this process the temperature rose and rose, to thousands of 
degrees, and the Sun started emitting radiations in the space.  
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Pitch-dark it was, – old Qfwfq confirmed, – I was only a child, I can barely 
remember it. We were there, as usual, with Father and Mother, Granny Bb’b, 
some uncles and aunts who were visiting, Mr. Hnw, the one who later became a 
horse, and us little ones (Calvino 1968: 17). 
 
WITHOUT COLORS 
Before forming its atmosphere and its oceans, the Earth must have resembled a 
gray ball revolving into space. As Moon does now: where the ultraviolet rays 
radiated by the Sun arrive directly, all colors are destroyed, which is why the cliffs of 
the lunar surface, instead of being colored like Earth’s, are of a dead, uniform gray. 
If the Earth displays a varicolored countenance, it is thanks to the atmosphere, 
which filters that murderous light. 
 
A bit monotonous, – Qfwfq confirmed, – but restful, all the same. I could go for 
miles and miles at top speed, the way you can move when there isn’t any air 
about, and all I could see was gray upon gray (Calvino 1968: 49). 
 
Here, finally, the creative horizon is offered by Einstein’s relativity 
theory: 
 
THE FORM OF SPACE 
The equations of the gravitational field which relate the curve of space to the 
distribution of matter are already becoming common knowledge. 
 
To fall in the void as I fell: none of you knows what that means. For you, to fall 
means to plunge perhaps from twenty-sixth floor of a skyscraper […]: to fall 
headlong, grope in the air a moment, and then the Earth is immediately there, and 
you get a big bump. But I’m talking about the time when there wasn’t any Earth 
underneath or anything else solid […]. You simply fell, indefinitely, for an 
indefinite length of time. […] Now that I think about it, there weren’t any proof 
that I was really falling: perhaps I had always remained immobile in the same 
place, or I was moving in an upward direction; since there was no above or below 
these were only nominal questions and so I might just as well go on thinking I 
was falling, as I was naturally led to think (Calvino 1968: 115).  
 
THE LIGHT-YEARS 
The more distant a galaxy is, the more swiftly it moves away from us. A galaxy 
located at ten billion light-years from us, would have a speed of recession equal to 
the speed of light, three hundred thousand kilometers per second. […] 
 
One night I was, as usual, observing the sky with my telescope. I noticed that a 
sign was hanging from a galaxy a hundred million light-years away. On it was 
written: I SAW YOU. I made a quick calculation: the galaxy’s light had taken a 
hundred million years to reach me, and since they saw up there what was taking 
place here a hundred million years later, the moment when they had seen me 
must date back two hundred million years. Even before I checked my diary to see 
what I had been doing that day, I was seized by a ghastly presentiment: exactly 
two hundred million years before, not a day more nor a day less, something had 
happened to me that I had always tried to hide (Calvino 1968: 125).  
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Moving from apparently abstract concepts and from situations that 
are totally outside the field of human experience, Calvino enacts a 
narrative/cognitive hybridization: he translates scientific hypotheses and 
theories into the language of our everyday life; he anthropomorphizes 
and familiarizes them, disguising them as the setting for ordinary 
situations. In so doing, he shapes a world which describes itself in human 
terms, long before the human could even be thought as possible. This 
technique generates a double paradox: on the one hand, the paradox of 
situations which are humanly non observable, but that become 
meaningful only when observed by a human eye (e.g.: a universe without 
colors); or that become definable only within the sensorial system of 
human experience (e.g.: a fall into the void, in the absence of gravity force 
and also of spatio-temporal coordinates: The Form of Space). On the 
other, the paradox of a human that, in all these estranged and un-
experienceable situations, is already and always “at home,” with all its 
emotional and relational dynamics, embodied in the chaotic genealogies 
of aquatic uncles, dinosaurs, nebulae, horses, and cosmic rays. These 
paradoxes produce a ludic mechanism and a fictional technique which 
perfectly fit in the “ecology” of the comic genre, as defined by Meeker. 
In fact, among the characters with which Qfwfq interacts in the 
course of his countless metamorphoses, one can count: 1. tight 
cooperation—sometimes in the form of a playful antagonism (The Light-
Years, How Much Shall We bet?, A Sign in Space, Games Without End, etc.); 
2. intra- and inter-specific unity (in The Dinosaurs, for example, the 
encounter between the last dinosaur and the “New Ones” is described 
through a narrative climax, which moves from the distress caused by the 
discovery of an “alien” – whether a stranger, an enemy, someone racially 
“other” – to conflict, and eventually to cooperation and peaceful mutual 
acceptance). Finally, Qfwfq himself is a Picaro, a character that, by 
definition, adapts to the world and evolves with it, passing through 
unlikely adventures (The Distance of the Moon), successful or failed 
rejoining (Without Colors, The Aquatic Uncle), and, ultimately, a complete 
“subversion” of values, which are re-conceptualized in horizontal and 
non-hierarchical terms (The Dinosaurs, The Spiral, etc.). The frame of all 
this is an “infinite game,” whose only purpose is the self-realization of the 
universe. In its very structure and title, Calvino’s book is indeed a comedy 
of the universe, a cosmological Darwinism, the collective evolutionary 
biography of the world. In creating such a text, Calvino seems to 
narratively translate David Orr’s idea that “[e]cological literacy presumes 
that we understand our place in the story of evolution” (Orr 1992: 92-93). 
In fact, spontaneously and freely, Qfwfq is and becomes a huge number of 
things, reminding us of the permeability and continuity between all 
beings existing in a universe made of energy and matter. The narrative 
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outcome is a world, which is anthropomorphic in its representation but 
non-anthropocentric in its horizon of meanings and values.  
The critical impact of this strategy is powerful. In fact, the ecological 
and Darwinian vision of the interdependence among life-forms 
challenges the dualisms conveyed by instrumentalism and 
anthropocentrism. These dualisms are not only set on the ecological level, 
between human and nonhuman nature, but they also act on the social 
level, between dominating and dominated societies and subjects. It is 
fruitful, here, to apply another interesting development of Bateson’s 
theory, namely the idea of “literature as a cultural ecology,” as formulated 
by Hubert Zapf. Literature, according to Zapf, “acts like an ecological 
principle or an ecological energy within the larger system of cultural 
discourses” (Zapf 2006, 49-70: 55).4 It is a “sensorium” and a dynamic 
principle through which a culture can objectify, develop and shape its 
inner dialectics and its values, and it functions as “cultural-critical meta-
discourse,” “imaginative counter-discourse,” and “re-integrative 
interdiscourse” (see Zapf 2006). This means that, on the one hand, 
literature represents deficits, imbalances, and contradictions, “within 
dominant systems of civilisatory power” (Zapf 2006: 62).5 On the other 
hand, it has a compensative and balancing function, orienting the 
evolutionary dynamics of cultural discourse toward the reintegration of 
“what is marginalized, neglected, repressed or excluded” (Zapf 2006: 56). 
Zapf writes:  
 
[B]y breaking up closed circuits of dogmatic world views and exclusionary truth-
claims in favour of plural perspectives, multiple meanings and dynamic 
interrelationships, literature becomes the site of a constant, creative renewal of 
language, perception, communication, and imagination (Zapf 2006: 56).6 
 
Acting as an ecological and ethical principle, literature can therefore 
underpin “conscious” dynamics in the evolution of cultural systems. It 
helps establish different orders of priorities and creates communication 
between “central” and “marginal” subjects. “Otherness” is in this way 
                                                                   
4 See also Zapf (2002: 3): “Literatur verhält sich in Analogie zu einem ökologischen 
Prinzip oder einer ökologischen Kraft innerhalb des größeren Systems ihrer Kultur”; 
and Zapf (2008). 
5 See also Zapf (2002: 64). 
6 See also Zapf (2002: 6): “Literatur erfüllt so im Haushalt der Kultur die Aufgabe, 
eindeutige Welt- und Selbstbilder zu subvertieren und auf das von ihnen 
ausgeblendete Andere zu öffnen; eindimensionale Realitätskostrukte in 
mehrdimensionale Bedeutungsprozesse zu überführen; das von dominanten 
kulturellem Diskursen Ausgegrenzte zu artikulieren und in seiner ganzen 
Vielgestaltigkeit der symbolischen Erfahrung zugänglich zu machen, das heisst für die 
Erneuerung kultureller Kreativität zu aktivieren.” 
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relocated in the historical-social dialectics as a necessary form of cultural 
biodiversity.7 As an ecological principle, literature thus aims at restoring 
balances, elements, and functions of cultural ecosystems.  
Confronted with the ideologies of mastery, literature’s stance is not 
only cultural and educational, but also eminently political. Calvino is 
perfectly aware of this when, in his essay Right and Wrong Political Uses 
of Literature, he writes:  
 
Literature is necessary to politics above all when it gives a voice to whatever is 
without a voice, when it gives a name to what as yet has no name, especially to 
what the language of politics excludes or attempts to exclude. […] Literature is 
like an ear that can hear things beyond the understanding of the language of 
politics; it is like an eye that can see beyond the color spectrum perceived by 
politics. […] [T]he writer may happen to discover areas that no one has explored 
before, […] and to make discoveries that sooner or later turn out to be vital areas 
of collective awareness (Calvino 1986: 99-100). 
 
Hubert Zapf’s definition of literature as a “sensorium” of a culture’s 
imbalances and blind spots is a perfect theoretical pendant to this 
description of literature as a voice, an “ear,” or an “eye.” The key point of 
Calvino’s discourse is that literature, as an extension of moral 
imagination, is politically subversive, because it “is one of a society’s 
instruments of self-awareness,” and this self-awareness moves on by 
“challenging authority” (Calvino 1986: 96-99). Such a “challenge” and 
such “self-awareness” are an invitation to reconfigure identity as a 
relational concept. In a short writing of 1977, titled “Identity”, for 
instance, Calvino maintains that “the most solid and self-confident 
identity is nothing but a sort of bag or hosepipe full of swirling 
heterogeneous stuff,” “a bunch of diverging lines finding in the individual 
their point of intersection” (Identità; Calvino 2003: II, 2825-6. My 
translation). Whether individual or social, identity is definable and 
understandable only through the relationship it has with all “the rest,” 
with the “outer world”: “it is the outside that defines the inside, in the 
horizon of space, as well as in the vertical dimension of time” (Calvino 
2003: II, 2827. My translation). There is no winning without humility in 
the identity game. And there is no real identity, if one is not willing to 
listen to “whatever is without a voice,” as Calvino said. 
This resonates with a passage from the book The Natural Alien, 
written in 1985 by the Canadian philosopher and zoologist Neil 
Evernden:  
 
Mitochondria, the energy-providing structures within each cell, replicate 
independently of the cell and are composed of RNA, which is dissimilar to that of 
                                                                   
7 See Iovino (2006: 38-43). On “conscious evolution,” see Ornstein, Ehrlich (1990). 
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the rest of the cell. Apparently the mitochondria move into the cells like colonists 
and continue their separate existence within. We cannot exist without them, and 
yet they may not strictly be “us.” Does it mean that we must regard ourselves as 
colonies? […] Where do we draw the line between one creature and another? 
Where does one stop and the other begin? Is there even a boundary between you 
and the non-living world, or will the atoms of this page be part of you tomorrow? 
In short, how can you make any sense of the concept of man as a discrete entity? 
(Evernden 1985: 39-40). 
 
In a very intriguing way, Qfwfq is the answer Calvino provides to 
these questions. However, while Evernden addresses this issue from the 
point of view of a single cell, Calvino takes the point of view (or the points 
of view) of the universe. Qfwfq’s evolutions confront us with an identity 
which is anti-subjective, open, and relational. In a word: an ecological 
identity, one based upon the interrelation between self and environment, 
inside and outside. Qfwfq’s identity is a transitive and transitional 
identity; one made of “swirling heterogeneous stuff,” being at the same 
time “the outside” and “the inside,” “in the horizon of space, as well as in 
the vertical dimension of time.” In spite of the anthropomorphic stance of 
Calvino’s narrative technique, in this work the human is not simply 
leveled out, but restructured in terms of complexity.  
The Cosmicomics calls us to reconsider the psychological models of 
human-nonhuman interaction that lead to forms of cognitive and 
environmental alienation as a consequence of a fracture in the “ecology of 
mind.” Against this eco-ontological fracture, describing identity as a 
constant exchange of outside and inside implies a renewed awareness of 
the world. This awareness is an invitation to recognize other existing 
beings as something that, although not belonging to us, are deeply and 
essentially akin to us. In that it rejects the idea that humans possess the 
world, this awareness re-creates non-utilitarian and non-hierarchical 
relationships between self and non-self. The mind, on whose alleged 
individuality identity is grounded, is not to be considered as an exclusive 
function of the human subject, seen as ontologically diverging from the 
natural world. As Bateson theorized, “mind” is rather the creative 
cybernetic syntax of the systemic human-environment complex. 
Therefore, to abstract the mind from the world means to prepare our 
own extinction. As Bateson affirms: 
 
If you put God outside and set him vis-à-vis his creation and you have the idea 
that you are created in his image, you will logically see yourself as outside and 
against the things around you. And as you arrogate all mind to yourself, you will 
see the world around you as mindless and therefore not entitled to moral or 
ethical consideration. The environment will seem to be yours to exploit. […] If this 
is your estimate of your relation to nature and you have an advanced technology, 
your likelihood of survival will be that of a snowball in hell (Bateson 2000: 468). 
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Works like The Cosmicomics aim to “diffuse” the mind, presenting it 
as a site where things connect. The ethical-educational implications of 
this vision are significant: if we consider mind as a connecting structure, 
as “a pattern which connects” (Bateson, 1979: 8), we are more inclined to 
interpret human and natural phenomena in terms of similarity and 
communication rather than the extreme poles of an irreducible dualism. 
This allows us to measure the effects of our actions on the scale of an 
“extended” responsibility, a responsibility expanded in space and time. In 
other words, the scope of our acts and of our responsibility is not only 
“intra-species” but also “inter-species,” not only “intra-generational,” but 
also “inter-generational.” Toward other life forms, such a responsibility 
consists in the acknowledgement of their intrinsic value; toward other 
humans, it is a future-oriented project.  
What is, then, the function of literature, in such a conceptual and 
ethical horizon? And what is the function of comedy as a literary genre, in 
The Cosmicomics? The function of literature is to broaden the categories 
of what is possible, to enlarge moral imagination. By extending the 
narrative space to include pre-human subjects ironically disguised as 
humans, Calvino reverts the anthropocentric paradigm. Literature 
becomes the concrete “compensatory stance” allowing Calvino to 
“subvert unilateral images of the world and of the self;” it is therefore 
possible to open the narrative space not only “to the ‘other’ which is 
hidden by” these images but also to the “other” which is hidden in them.8 
In fact, Qfwfq indicates an “other” which is present within the human and 
at the same time a human which is present in its “other.”  
In The Cosmicomics, literature is fabula, a narration that, through the 
comic mode, provides us with a cognitive experience of the world—a 
cognitive experience, which is something more than a construction of the 
self: “I have always sought out in the imagination a means to attain a 
knowledge that is outside the individual, outside the subjective,” Calvino 
writes in his famous Six Memos for the Next Millennium (Calvino, 1993: 
91). Fabula, the fairy tale, is an endless “as if”-game. It is the world as if, in 
any event or story, a moral would really exist; it is making nonhuman 
beings talk as if they had a language accessible to humans; it is a 
reconstruction of the universe as if there were a continuity between the 
forms of the past and those of the future, of human and nonhuman, of real 
and imaginary. As if everything were a game, or as if it weren’t: which, 
from the viewpoint of the universe, is exactly the same thing. The 
Cosmicomics is an evolutionary tale about the nonhuman, about 
everything that is other-than-human as if it were human. It is, we might 
                                                                   
8 See Zapf, 2002: 6. 
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say, a Darwinian tale which posits the human as a possibility inside the 
nonhuman, and not as its intrinsic finality. An ontologically-leveling 
narrative expedient, Qfwfq’s “recapitulation” is a way to reconcile the 
human with its immanent nonhuman root.  
On this non-anthropocentric vision lies Calvino’s famous 
“enlightenment,” a philosophy intended not to be a blunt celebration of 
reason, but to make human beings cognizant about this very reason’s 
boundaries. Such an awareness enables creative strategies: in fact, the 
recognition of their limits drives humans to imagine better conditions to 
experience the world and to live in it. This is also the very gist of 
ecological culture: the self, the ego, helps us experience the world, but the 
world is not made only for the self. We have to learn to live beyond the 
self, if we want to have a real experience of the world. In this, ecological 
culture, a culture of both limit and possibility, is a new enlightenment, a 
new humanism.9 
The only way to survive in a changing world, Darwin has taught us, is 
to evolve. Literary ecology is an invitation to do so consciously, by way of 
a creative act of responsibility, imagining that even tales and fables could 
be an extended strategy for a shared (and not exclusively human) 
survival. 
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